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ROTHE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
262 F.3D 1306 (FED. CIR. 2001)

FACTS
Plaintiff Rothe Development Corporation ("Rothe") submitted the lowest
bid for a contract to service an Air Force Base telecom system.' Despite
submitting the lowest bid, Rothe lost the contract to another firm, ICT because
the bid solicitor invoked the § 1207 program2 .3 This program permits the
United States Department of Defense ("DOD") to give preference to bids
submitted by businesses owned by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals4 ("SDB's"). 5 The bid solicitor for each contract has the discretion
to decide whether or not to invoke the § 1207 program. If choosing to apply
the program, the solicitor increases the bids submitted by all non-SDB's by a
uniform factor, up to ten percent.7 The application of this "price-evaluation
adjustment" resulted in the award of the government contract to ICT, an SDB,
rather than to Rothe, a non-SDB that had submitted the lowest pre-adjustment
bid.'
Congress originally passed the § 1207 program in 1989.' It was initially
intended to be in effect for three years.' ° However, minority involvement in
the defense industry did not reach the stated objective, and Congress

'Rothe Dev. Corp. v. D.O.D., 262 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3859, 3973 (1986) (as amended), codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 2323
(1994).
3Rothe,
262 F.3d at 1315.
4 d. at 1314 n.4. (The § 1207 program
identifies five groups (consisting
of a total of 37 subgroups) of minorities, members of which are presumed to
be among the socially and economically disadvantaged class this legislation
is intended to assist. The identified groups are Black Americans, Hispanic
Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, and Subcontinent
Asian Americans.).
5Id. at 1315.
2Section

6

Id.

7

1d.

s1d.
9 d. at 1312.
°Id. at 1313.
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reauthorized the program in 1992 for seven more years." Rothe filed this
action during the reauthorization period.' 2 Because the court treats statutory
reauthorization as a distinct legislative proceeding, it reviewed the
congressional proceedings in 1992 to determine the constitutionality of this
statute. 3 In support of the constitutionality of the statute, the defendant also
submitted evidence to the trial court that had emerged since 1992.14
Rothe commenced this action in the Western District of Texas to challenge
the constitutionality of the § 1207 program under the implied equal protection
provision of the Fifth Amendment. 6 The district court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment. 7 Plaintiff Rothe appealed the
decision to the Fifth Circuit, which transferred the action to the Federal Circuit
as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction." The circuit court considered both
the level ofjudicial scrutiny required in reviewing the constitutionality of the
§ 1207 program as well as the admissibility of evidence which had emerged
since 1992.'9

HOLDING
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court
improperly applied a deferential standard of review, when the appropriate
standard was strict scrutiny. The district court also impermissibly based its
decision on post-reauthorization evidence supporting the statute's
constitutionality.2' The circuit court remanded the case to the trial court for
findings of fact within the established parameters.22

"Id. at 1314.
12Id"

131d.
1Id. at 1322.
'"U.S. CONST. amend. 5.
6Rothe, 262 F.3d at 1315.
1Id. at 1316.
' 81d.
'2091d.
1d. at 1332.
21Id"
22

Id"
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ANALYSIS
Congress drew upon its spending authority under Article 123 when it
included race-based conditions for appropriating federal funds for the armed
forces under the § 1207 program.2 4 Its stated goal was to increase participation
of small, disadvantaged businesses in fulfilling defense contracts.25 Congress
would consider the DOD compliant with the stated goal when it had achieved
a rate of five percent SDB participation in the total dollar amount of contracts
awarded.26
A. Standardof Review
In Adarand Constructors v. Pena ("Adarand")2 7 , the Supreme Court
settled the question of the level of scrutiny required for race-based
classifications.28 Before Adarand,courts had routinely applied differing levels
of judicial scrutiny to suspect classifications, depending upon what
governmental body had enacted them.29 Adaranddetermined that a race-based
classification established by any government actor, whether federal or state,
necessarily implicates the rights of those affected.3" According to Adarand,
courts must hold all race-based classifications to the highest level of judicial
scrutiny.3 Adarand also included a requirement that the measure be remedial
in nature.32 Having identified the need to apply strict scrutiny, the circuit court
looked to a prior case, City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. ("Croson")33 for
a definition.34 In Croson, the Court determined that to satisfy strict scrutiny,
a race-based classification must serve a "compelling interest" and be
"narrowly tailored" to suit that interest.35
23U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
at 1317.

24Rothe, 262 F.3d
251d. at 1313.

261d.

27Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
2
Rothe, 262 F.3d at 1318.
29

1d"

30

1d. at 1319.
31Id"
32
1d"
33
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
34Rothe,
262 F.3d at 1319.
35
1d. at 1318.
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Here, however, the district court determined that a race-based
classification established by Congress deserved greater deference from the
reviewing court than one imposed by other legislative bodies.36 The district
court perceived in the dissent and plurality of Adarand that deference to
congressional proceedings was still permissible and reviewed the § 1207
program under a standard much more deferential than what strict scrutiny
would allow.3 7 The appellate court determined that this was an error on the
part of the district court and remanded the case, specifically requiring that it
conduct an analysis according to the Croson strict scrutiny test.38
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The appellate court also specifically instructed the district court that, on
remand, it was to conduct a more thorough examination of the evidence used
by Congress in determining the need for remedial race-based measures. 39 In
the original trial, the court failed to take the necessary steps required as part of
independent judicial review.'
In order to determine that Congress was serving a "compelling interest"
and responding to a situation deserving of remedial measures, the district court
must examine the factual basis upon which Congress acted.4' In this case, the
district court had done little more than verify that Congress had done some
research; the court's opinion contained a list of some of the documents that
Congress relied upon in enacting the § 1207 program.42 Croson makes clear
that in order to uphold the affirmative action program, the court must find a
"strong basis in evidence" for the conclusions of the legislative authority.4 3 In
Rothe, the appellate court required that, "the district court set forth detailed
findings as to the scope and content of the reports" and the inferences drawn
upon those facts, so that the reviewing court may determine on the record
alone, whether the necessary "strong basis" was present.' The district court
must point to facts within the reports to determine whether the conclusions
361d.

at 1319.
1320.
3 Id. at 1321.
39
1d. at 1323.
401d. at 1322.
41
id. at 1329.
42
1d. at 1328.
43Id. at 1329.
37

Id. at

44Id.
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drawn by Congress were appropriate.4 5 A simple recitation of sources and
deference to Congressional judgment does not satisfy the test for a strong basis
in evidence.'
C. Review of "Post-enactment"Evidence
The district court had the responsibility to determine if the § 1207 program
was unconstitutional as enacted.4 7 The court should only have considered the
evidence available at the time Congress passed the statute and should not have
relied on any evidence that has developed since that time.48 Here, however,
the district court had relied on evidence presented by defendant which was not
available until after the statute was enacted. The appellate court found that
the district court erred in deferring to the Congressional determination that a
compelling interest did exist.5"
The debate over the use of post-enactment evidence arose because of
ambiguity in the standard for review.' Courts must find a "strong basis in
evidence" at the litigation stage, but there was some question as to whether the
same standard is required of legislatures enacting laws.52 Though some
circuits have found that less evidence is required for the enactment than is
required for the court review5 3, the Federal Circuit followed the Supreme Court
opinion in Shaw v. Hunt,54 which found no difference.55 The standard
requiring a "strong basis in evidence" exists to make sure that legislatures do
not use race-based classifications for illegitimate reasons.56 The court is only
able to review legislative decisions for legitimacy if the legislatures are held

45

1d.

46Id.
471d. at
'48Id.at
49

Id.

1325.
1327.
at 1328.

501d.
511d. at 1326.
52
Id.
53Ensley

Branch NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1994);
Contractors Ass'n of E. Penn., Inc. v. City of Phila., 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir.
1996).
54Shaw
v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
"Rothe, 262 F.3d at 1326.
561d. at 1327.
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to the same standards when enacted as they are when reviewed." Therefore,
in reviewing the constitutionality of the statute, the court should search for a
"strong basis in evidence" in the materials used by the legislature in making
their decision to enact the law."8

CONCLUSION
This case serves to solidify the rulings of the Supreme Court regarding the
review of race-based classifications enacted by Congress. It makes clear that
such congressional action must be reviewed with strict scrutiny. Deference to
the findings of Congress would effectively negate the requirement for strict
scrutiny in reviewing federally established race-based classifications. Suspect
classifications run a grave danger of abridging equal protection rights.
Congress may employ race-based classifications, but only to serve the
compelling interest of remedying past wrongs. Deference to Congressional
determinations gives no recourse to those whose rights are transgressed if
Congress acts beyond the scope of its authority. The Federal Circuit was right
to push this case back in line with precedent and not allow the trial court to
carve out a different standard based on the plurality opinion in Adarand.59
The troubling aspects of this opinion are the requirements established for
finding a compelling interest. The Federal Circuit would require a legislative
body which is considering race-based remedial programs to have specific
findings of prior discrimination with lingering effects, or present
discrimination in each industry, for each minority which is to be favored.6'
The court also seems to favor the use of statistical data to establish inequity
worthy of remedial action.6
The § 1207 program relied upon previous work done by the Small
Business Administration to identify groups of socially and economically
disadvantaged people.62 Congress should be allowed to rely upon these
findings unless they are invalidated or shown to be outdated. The inclusion of
the five racial groups in the enactment of the § 1207 program is merely a

57Id.

58Id"
59

1d. at 1320.

6Id.
at 1330.
6 'Id.at 1323.
62 d. at 1314.
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presumption that individual members of these groups qualify as SDB's. 63 The
structure of the program allows either unsuccessful bidders or authorized
government actors to challenge the SDB status of another competitor and
allows rightful SDB's to waive their status as such.'
For the sake of
administrative economy, the § 1207 program made a predetermination that
members of certain minority groups would likely qualify for the race-based
privileges.6 ' There may not always be a significantly large sample size for a
government actor to determine the degree of discrimination present for each
racial group within each industry. The Small Business Administration,
exercising authority in its field of expertise, found that certain groups tended
to be disadvantaged.' This evidence reasonably supports a presumption that
the listed minority groups are indeed at a social and economic disadvantage.
The inclusion of a provision to expel from SDB status businesses that do not
rightfully belong in that class justifies the program's use of that presumption.
The court's assertion that statistical data will serve as the best evidence of
racial inequality exacerbates the problem in requiring a showing of
discrimination against each racial group in every industry. It is quite
reasonable to expect that the population of certain specific minorities in a
given industry may be negligible, and yet that the few involved will face racial
discrimination. Requiring statistical data specific to each minority in each
industry may permit widespread discrimination, without hope for remedial
action, against all truly marginal populations. There is no ideal barometer for
determining the racial climate of any geographic region, in any particular
industry for any specific minority. Statistical data can be evidence, as can
anecdotal data. To overemphasize either of these categories of evidence is no
less of a danger than underemphasizing them all, which may allow rampant
discrimination to go unchecked.
If discrimination against a minority population in any region in a given
industry exists, it is at least as reasonable to expect that other minorities suffer
similar discrimination as it is to presume that all other minorities are treated
fairly. Any minority group not presumed to be an SDB has no opportunity for
aid from this program. However, because status as an SDB is merely a
presumption and not a truism, any individual business that does not satisfy the
requisite qualifications may be challenged and prohibited from receiving the
aid of the § 1207 program. There is recourse against individual businesses
63

1d.

6Id.
65

1d.

66Id.
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erroneously included within the SDB classification, but no recourse for those
erroneously excluded; therefore, there is less harm in initially over-applying
SDB status than in initially under-applying it.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Glenn Thompson

